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COMMENTS 
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION: A 
STATE-CREATED OBSTACLE TO 
A MINOR WOMAN'S RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY 
The level of sexual activity of minors has risen and 
continues to rise. The number of teenage pregnancies has also 
risen and it is estimated that if this trend continues, four out of 
every ten minor women will become pregnant at least once.1 
Abortion has become a major means by which minor women are 
preventing unwanted pregnancies, but access to abortions for 
minor women has become increasingly controversial. The issue 
of whether or not parents should be informed of their daughter's 
abortion decision has recently received attention from both the 
courts and legislatures. 
A woman's freedom to decide whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy has been protected as a fundamental right of 
privacy. I This important right has also been extended to minor 
women. S Traditionally, minors have been more restricted than 
1. It is estimated that the proportion of all minor women who have ever been 
premaritally pregnant rose from 9% in 1971 to 13% in 1976 to 16% in 1979. Some 
12,000,000 teenagers are sexually active resulting in approximately 1,000,000 teenage 
pregnancies per year. Meyers, Are Minors Entitled to Medical PrilJacy? 10 STUDENT 
LAWYER 19 (1981); Zelnick & Kanter, Sexual ActilJity, ContraceptilJe Use and 
Pregnancy Among Metropolitan-Area Teenagers: 1971-1979, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 230 
(1980). 
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court in Roe held that the right of privacy 
included a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy. For further discussion 
of Roe, see infra note 43. 
3. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Court decided that a 
state did not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute veto over 
a minor woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. For further discussion of 
Danforth, see infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
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adults in their rights and activities.· Restrictions have been 
grounded in the belief that minors lack the maturity and 
capacity necessary to understand the consequences of their 
actions and to make decisions.a The constitutional rights of 
minors have, therefore, been limited because of this traditional 
viewpoint.' 
The Supreme Court has never equated minors' 
constitutional rights with those of adults. It has extended due 
process rights to minors, but has not interpreted the due process 
clause to provide constitutional protections equal to those of 
4. It was believed necessary to limit the freedom of minors because they were "in a 
state to require being taken care of by others, [and) must be protected against their own 
actions as well as against external injury." J. MILL, ON LumRTY 11 (D. Spitz ed. 1975). 
This attitude towards minors is reflected in the numerous ways in which their activities 
and rights are restricted. California statutory restrictions are typical of those found in 
other jurisdictions. Minors may not contract freely. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 34, 35 (West 
Supp. 1980). Minors are restricted in work by child labor laws. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 
1290, 1292·1294 (West 1971). They may not marry without parental consent. See CAL. 
CIV. CODE §§ 4101,4201 (West Supp. 1980). They may not vote. See CAL. Euc. CODE § 
17 (West 1977). 
5. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1970), in which the Court recognizes that the 
freedom of minors may be limited: 
[T]he Court has held that the States validly may limit the 
freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of 
important, affirmative choices with potentially serious 
consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the 
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and 
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them. 
Jd. at 635 (footnote omitted); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), in 
which the Court distinguishes between the rights of adulta and those of children or 
minors: 
[A]t least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like 
someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full 
capacity for individual choice . . . . It is only upon such a 
premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children 
of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right 
to vote-<ieprivations that would be constitutionally 
intolerable for adults. 
Jd. at 649·50 (footnotes omitted). See also Hafen, Children', Liberation and the New 
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (asserting that too much freedom for minors would undermine the 
preparatory role of the family which is a prerequisite to the existence of a rational and 
productive individual). 
6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding right of Amish parents to 
refuse to send their children to high school); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (parents have right to choose their children's education). 
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adults. 'I Minor women do have the constitutional right to decide 
whether to bear a child,8 but the states have greater latitude in 
regulating that right with respect to minors than they do with 
adults.8 The Court has also traditionally upheld the parents' 
right to direct freely their children's upbringing and education.lo 
The constitutionality of parental notification statutes is yet 
to be decided. The issue was addressed by the ·Court in H.L. v. 
Matheson. ll However, the Court failed to decide conclusively 
the constitutionality of parental notification requirements 
because the holding was very narrow and only applied to minor 
women who are not mature enough to make an abortion 
decision. II This issue needs to be resolved as a number of states 
have attempted to limit a minor woman's access to abortion. II 
7. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring due process protections before 
suspension from school); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing certain rights in 
juvenile court hearings). 
8. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1967). 
9. The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) and Bellotti v. 
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1970), indicated that a state may constitutionally require some 
parental involvement in a minor woman's abortion decision. 
10. See cases cited supra note 6. 
11. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
12. Id. at 411. The Court held that immature minors often lack the ability to make 
informed choices that take into account immediate and long· range consequences; 
therefore, a state may determine t}iat parental consultation is desirable. 
13. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81·54 (Smith·Hurd Supp. 1981·1982) which 
provides in part: 
No abortion shall be performed in this state if the woman is 
under 18 years of age and has not married except: 
(3) After the consent of her parents is secured and 
certified in writing. 
If one of the parents has died, has deserted his or her 
family, or is not available, consent by the remaining parent is 
sufficient. If both parents have died, have deserted their 
family or are not available, consent of the minor's guardian or 
other person standing in loco parentis is sufficient. 
If such consent is refused or cannot be obtained, consent 
may be obtained by order of a judge of the circuit court upon 
a finding, after such hearing as the judge deems necessary, 
that the pregnant minor fully understands the consequences 
of an abortion to her and her unborn child .... Notice of such 
hearing shall be sent to the parents of the minor at their last 
known address . . . . 
The Illinois statute does not permit a minor woman to enter the courts directly to 
obtain permission for an abortion. It is similar to the statute struck down in Bellotti 
which held that "every minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go 
directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents." Bellotti v. Baird, 
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Additionally, there have been congressional attempts to qualify 
a minor woman's access to abortion. I' Because the issue of 
parental notification remains unresolved, minor women cannot 
be assured of the right to choose an abortion even when abortion 
may be their only choice. Dramatic increases in teenage 
pregnancies evidence the need for greater access to and 
information about abortion. This Comment argues that parental 
notification statutes unduly burden a minor woman's right of 
privacy as they impose a state-created obstacle to minor women 
who wish to exercise their right to have an abortion. This right 
means very little if state regulations or restrictions make access 
to abortions difficult or impossible. The interests that such 
regulations seek to protect - the health of the minor and the 
parent-child relations - are not served by parental notification. 
The health consequences for minor women who bear children 
are severe and the psychological health of minor women can be 
detrimentally affected by requiring parental notice.1& 
This Comment concludes that the only interests served by 
parental notification statutes are those of groups opposed to 
abortion. Since 1973, when the Court held in Roe v. Wade ll that 
a woman has a fundamental right to decide whether or not to 
bear a child, groups opposed to abortion have sought to overturn 
443 u.s. 622, 647 (1970). The Illinois parental consent requirement was held 
unconstitutional (as violative of equal protection for under inclusiveness in excluding 
married minors and over inclusive in including married, emanicapted minors) in Wynn v. 
Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978). For other state statutes which require either 
consent or notification see: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.35.5 (found unconstitutional 
under Bellotti v. Baird in Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980» 
(amended 1980) (West Supp. 1982); 1981 Minn. Seas. Law Serv. ch. 228 (amending 
MINN. STAT. § 144.343) (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. I 188.028 (Vernon Supp. 
1982) (held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. 
Mo. 1980»; NEB. REv. STAT. § 28·347 (Supp. 1981); NBV. REv. STAT. § 442.255 (1981); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14·02.103 (1980) (held unconstitutional in Leigh v. Olsen, 497 F. 
Supp. 1340 (D. N.D. 1980» (amended 1981) (Interim Supp. 1981). 
14. S. 158, S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Seas., 127 CONGo REc. 11,528·29 (daily ed. Oct. 
15, 1981) (the Human Life Statute) (declares that human life begins at conception and 
would extend the same legal protections to the unborn that apply to all persons); S.J. 
Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Human Life Federaliam Amendment) (would 
authorize Congress and the states to regulate or prohibit abortion). See also S. 1808, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Family Protection Act) (would have required parental 
notification for those contraception and abortion programs seeking federal funding). 
15. Women under the age of 20 have a higher rate of maternal complications. ALAN 
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TEENAGE PREGNANCY: THE PROBLEM THAT HASN'T GONE AWAY 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as TEENAGE PREGNANCY). 
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For further discussion of Roe see infra note 43. 
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this decision.17 These efforts, until recently, have been 
unsuccessful as the Court has struck down regulations which 
place an undue burden on a woman's right to privacy.18 In 1980, 
however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde 
Amendment which drastically limits funding for abortion. Ie 
There are many complex reasons for opposition to abortion, but 
opposition has focused on overturning Roe, or limiting access to 
abortion.1o Requiring parental notice will in effect limit access to 
an abortion for minor women and serve the interests of those 
opposed to abortion. 
17. Donovan, Half a Loaf: A New Antiabortion Strategy, 13 FAY. PLAN. PERSP. 262 
(1981). The author discussea the current antiabortion legislation which attempts to 
ovenide the Court's decision in Roe: 
Since 1973, when the Supreme Court held that the 
constitutional right to privacy included a woman's decision to 
have an abortion, there have been three basic types of 
constitutional amendments introduced in Congreaa: the 
human life amendment, which would bar abortions except to 
Bave the pregnant woman's life; the "paramount" human life 
amendment, which would impose an absolute ban on abortion 
with no exceptions; and a states' rights amendment, which 
would allow states to establish their own abortion policies, 88 
they did before 1973. 
18. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (determination of viability is for 
the judgment of an attending physician; state cannot determine viability without 
allowing for judgment of physician); Mahoning Women's Center v. Hunter, 610 F.2d 456 
(6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 447 U.S. 918 (1979) (ordinances which impose a series of costly 
medical and building code regulations on abortion facilities are unconstitutional); 
Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440 U.S. 941 (1978) (statute 
requiring a woman to be informed that an infant born alive during an attempted 
abortion is a ward of state is unconstitutional); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th 
Cir. 1976) (state cannot enact legislation which has the etrect of establishing a 
presumption of viability of the fetus prior to 24 weeks); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (state cannot require that a woman be informed of fetal 
development prior to abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 
(E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd Bub nom., Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (state cannot 
require written consent of spouse). 
19. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 291 (1980). The Hyde Amendment refers to funding 
restrictions adopted by Congress barring the use of federal funds for reimbursement of 
abortion costs under the Medicaid program. For further discussion of the funding issue, 
see generally Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Procreative 
Choice Guaranteed for All Women, infra page 691. 
20. The right-to-life movement is at a critical point in its crusade to 
prohibit abortion. With an administration publicly committed to 
outlawing abortion, antiabortion senators 88 chairmen of key 
committees, and many abortion opponents newly elected to the 
House and Senate, the year [l981} began with the widespread 
expectation that Congreaa would take some action to override the 
Supreme Court's 1973 decisions legalizing abortion. 
Donovan, supra note 17, at 262. 
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I. BACKGROUND: THE PROBLEM OF TEENAGE 
PREGNANCY 
Parental notification must be considered in the context of 
increasing teenage sexual activity and pregnancies. II While the 
level of sexual activity and pregnancy has risen, efforts by minor 
women to avoid pregnancy and childbirth have intensified. II Mi-
nor women have increased their efforts to avoid pregnancy by 
increasing the use of contraceptives.1I Because they are not us-
ing the most effective methods of birth control, the pregnancy 
rate has continued to climb. If Abortion has, therefore, become a 
major means by which minor women prevent unwanted births." 
Abortions are sought by minor women because of the 
weighty and often adverse consequences of having a child. These 
range from interruption of the woman's education to early and 
unstable marriages. Ie Economic effects of childbirth can be par-
21. See 8upra note 1 and accompanying text. 
22. Zelnick & Kanter, 8upra note I, at 237. The authon found that minors were 
trying harder than ever to avoid pregnancy and childbirth. 
23. Id. The percentage of premarita1ly sexually active women aged 15-19 who ever 
experienced a premarital pregnancy and never used contraceptives declined from 58.8% 
in 1976 to 50.3% in 1979. Id. 
24. Id. Use of birth control pills declined 16% between 1976 and 1979. Use by fint-
time contraceptive users declined from 32.8% to 19.4%, whereas use of diaphragms, 
rhythm and withdrawal methods increased. The authors speculate that the declining use 
of the pill, especially with first-time contraceptive users, increased the prevalence of first 
pregnancies. 
25. In 1973,246,000 abortions were obtained by women 19 or younger. By 1978, the 
number almost doubled to 434,000. Women aged 15-19 terminated two-fifths of their 
pregnancies by abortion. The availability of abortion has led to better contraceptive use 
rather than a relaxation of contraceptive use. There is evidence that teenagers practice 
contraception much more effectively after they have had abortions. TuNAGB PREGNANCY, 
8upra note 15, at 52-53. Because of early age of initiation of intercourse and the aasoci-
ated nonuse of contraceptives, half of all premarital teenage pregnancies occur in the 
first six months after the minors become sexually active; one-fifth occur in the first 
month. Zabin, Kanter, & Aelnick, The Risk of Adolescent Pregnancy in the First 
Months of Intercour8e, 11 FAY. PLAN. PBRSP. 215 (1979). 
26. See Balwin & Cain, The Children of Teenage Parents, 12 FAN. PLAN. PBRSP. 34 
(1980). The authors found that children born to teenagers suffer intellectually, largely 
because of the economic and social impact of early childbearing on the young parents. 
Such children are more likely to spend part of their childhood in one-parent households 
and have children themselves while adolescents. Card & Wille, Teenage Mothers and 
Teenage Fathers: The Impact of Early Childbearing on the Parents' Per80nal and Pro-
fe88ional LiIJes, 10 FAN. PLAN. PBRSP. 199 (1978). The younger the parent at the birth of 
a child, the greater their educational setback. Young parents are more likely to hold low-
prestige jobs because they do not complete as many years of school. Furstenburg, The 
Social Consequences of Teenage Parenthood, 8 FAY. PLAN. PBRSP. 148 (1976). 
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ticularly severe when a minor woman drops out of high school 
and attempts to support herself and a child." Health conse-
quences for minor women who bear children can also be harsh. 
Maternal mortality and non-fatal maternal complications such 
as toxemia, anemia and complications from premature births are 
higher with women under twenty than with adult women. Ie Ac-
cess to an abortion is therefore a vital option for pregnant minor 
women faced with such consequences. Access to an abortion free 
from parental interference can be just as vital. For some minor 
women, parental notification will prevent them from obtaining 
an abortion.·e 
Many minor women, especially the very young, do consult 
their parents about their decision to have an abortion. so Younger 
women are far more likely to tell their parents of their decision, 
Three out of five premaritally pregnant mothers aged 17 and younger were sepa-
rated or divorced within eis years after they married. One-fifth of the marriages were 
di880lved within 12 monthe. Minor women 17 or younger are three times more likely, and 
their husbands twice as likely, to eplit up with their spouses than those who marry in 
their 20's. ALAN GlJTI'WACHBR INSTlTtITK, U Mn.uON 'rBBNAGBRS: WHAT CAN BE DONE 
ABoUT THE EPmunc or AooLBSCENT PitBGNANCIBS IN THE UNITBD STATES?, 28 (1976) 
(hereinafter cited 88 11 Mn.uON TaNAGBRSJ. 
?:l. See Moore, TeeMle Childbirth and Welfare Dependency, 10 FAM. PLAN. PBRSP. 
233 (1978). The author of this two-year study of teenage mothers concludes that a wo-
IJIIlD who bears a child during her teens is much more likely to be forced to support 
herself and her children on a low income or to become dependent on welfare asaistance 
than the woman who postpones childbearing. There are approximately 600,000 families 
with children five years old or younger headed by mothers aged 14-25. Two-thirds of 
these families are living below the poverty level. TaNAGB PRBGNANCY, .upra note 15, at 
33. 
28. The maternal death rate for 1977-78 among women under age 15 was 18 per 
100,000 live births. Non-fatal complications were higher for teenage mothers. They are 
15% more likely to have anemia and 23% more likely to suffer from complications of 
premature birth than are mothers who gave birth at ages 20-24. TEENAGE PREGNANCY, 
supra note 15, at 29. 
29. See infra notes 34 and 35 and accompanYing text. 
30. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use 
of Family Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PBRsp. 284 (1980). The au-
thors surveyed 2,540 family planning agencies that administered 5,000 clinics and 2,100 
hospitals which provide abortion services, inquiring about policies and practices concern-
ing parental notification and consent. They also surveyed 2,400 patients under the age of 
18 who obtained contraceptives and abortions at these facilities to determine whose par-
ents knew they were being provided these services. The study showed that 55% of those 
surveyed aaid their parents knew they were obtaining an abortion. Thirty-eight percent 
told their parents voluntarily; 13% aaid their parents suggested an abortion, 2% said 
their parents found out from a relative or friend and 2% reported that the clinic re-
quired them to tell their parents or informed their parents directly. Fifty-four percent of 
the abortion patients aaid they had diacussed their decision with their parents. [d. at 
288. 
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and their parents are more likely to refer them for an abortion. al 
However, many minor women do not consult their parents and 
do not wish to have their parents notified of their abortion deci-
sion.83 For some, it is a matter of personal autonomy and a de-
sire for minimal parental intervention.aa For many, parental in-
tervention could result in an undesired marriage, expulsion from 
home, or continuance of the pregnancy as a punishment for sex-
ual activity.s4 Other minor women could be exposed to physical 
or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support or, at the 
very least, parental pressure causing great emotional distress." 
Such consequences do not occur in all cases, especially because 
many minor women do consult their parents and receive support 
in making their decision. ae Parental interference and displeasure 
tends to be more frequent and pronounced where parents cannot 
accept their daughter's sexual maturity and activity or where 
parents have very strong feelings regarding abortion. a7 
A minor woman's interest in obtaining an abortion free of 
parental notice is great, especially when notification would pre-
31. Seventy-two percent of those minor women 15 or younger discussed their deci-
sion to obtain an abortion with their parents. rd. 
32. Forty-six percent of those surveyed said that their parents did not know of their 
decision. rd. 
33. Note, Parental Notification as a Prerequisite for Minors' Access to Contracep-
tives: A Behavioral and Legal Analysis, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 196, 203 (1979). 
34. The Court recognized in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth that conflict can exist 
in a family when a minor woman is pregnant. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). It also noted in 
Bellotti II that "many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young 
pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their par-
ents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U.S. 622, 647 (1970). 
Many adults are also disturbed by the idea of adolescent sexuality, and "they advo-
cate 'punishing' adolescents for their sexual activity in the hope that having bome an 
out-of-wedlock child, faced eductional disruption, and/or having undergone a painful 
premature pregnancy, the teenager will be persuaded to stop having sexual relations." 11 
MILLION TEENAGERS, supra note 26, at 56. Continuance of pregnancy as punishment and 
forced marriage were also seen as possibilities of parental interference by lower courts. 
See Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375, 1388 n.24 (7th Cir. 1978); Women's Community 
Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 560 (D. Me. 1979). 
35. In Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, the district court also noted 
as possible results of parental notification, parental pressure which in some cases would 
result in great emotional distress, physical and psychological risks to the minor woman, 
and delay on the part of the woman in seeking assistance with her pregnancy which 
would increase the hazards of an abortion if she chose to obtain one. 477 F. Supp_ 542, 
550 (D. Me. 1979). See also supra note 34. 
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra notes 34 and 35. 
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vent an abortion. The effects of requiring parental notification 
can be dramatic. One study on the probable impact of parental 
notification estimates that 19,000 minor women would resort to 
self-induced or illegal abortions and that 18,000 more minor wo-
men would bear unwanted children, were parental notification 
required.'8 In addition, another 5,000 minors would run away 
from home either to have the unwanted child or to obtain an 
illegal abortion.·e If the minor woman gives birth as a result of 
parental pressure, there are increased health risks to the child. 
For example, the infant death rate is higher for children born to 
women under twentyf° and minor women are far more likely to 
have premature, or low-birth-weight babies.u 
The impact on the health of the mother and child, the social 
and economic consequences, and the emotional and physical 
abuse affect not only minor women. The increase in illegal abor-
tions, unwanted children, and physically abused minors is felt 
by society as a whole." 
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF A MINOR WOMAN'S RIGHT OF 
PRIVACY 
A woman's freedom to decide whether or not to conceive or 
bear a child is a fundamental right which has recently been rec-
38. Zelnick & Kanter, supra note 1 at 291. In 1978, 184,000 teenagers aged 17 and 
younger obtained abortions. The authors applied the results of their survey to this statis-
tic and found that, if parental notification were required of all abortion providers, an 
additional 39,000 minor women might inform their parents. But a higher number, 42,000, 
would not obtain a legal abortion. Baeed on their findings, the authors conclude that 
19,000 minor women could be expected to attempt to obtain an illegal abortion, another 
18,000 would have an unwanted birth and another 5,000 would run away from home, 
either to have the unwanted birth or to obtain an abortion. 
39.Id. 
40. Babies born to minor women are far more likely to die in the first year of life 
than those born to mothers over the age of twenty. The risk of death is approximately 2 
times higher than that of babies born to mothers over 20, and greater than that of in-
fants born to mothers aged 40 or older-a high-risk age-group. The number of infant 
deaths per 1,000 live births is 20.7 for women under 20, 13.2 for women 20-24, 10.7 for 
women 25-29 and 14.8 for women over 40. TEENAGE PREGNANCY, supra note 15, at 29. 
41. Id. This risk is 39% higher for babies born to minor women than for babies born 
to women over 20. 
42. The projected cost to society has not been statistically assessed as yet, but minor 
women will become economically dependent upon state and federal services as the num-
ber of unwanted births increase and as more minor women do not finish high school. 
These results cannot fail to have an etrect on society as a whole. 
9
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ognized by the Court. U In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth," 
the right to decide whether or not to bear a child was extended 
to minor women. A state statutory provision requiring written 
parental consent before a physician could perform an abortion 
on a minor woman was invalidated by the Court. The Court rea-
soned that: 
[T]he state does not have the constitutional au-
thority to give a third party an absolute, and pos-
sibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the phy-
sician and his patient to terminate the patient's 
pregnancy .... 
Constitutional rights do not mature and come 
into being magically only when one attains the 
state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as 
adults, are protected by the Constitution and pos-
sess constitutional rights.·' 
The Court also recognized that a state has broader authority to 
regulate the activities of minor women than it has in regulating 
those of adult women.·' However, the Court stated that before 
43. The right of privacy was recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). In reviewing a state statute prohibiting access to contraceptives, the Court em-
phasized the privacy of the marital relationship to support its finding the statute uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 485-86. The right of privacy, according to Justice Douglas, originated 
from those protections afforded by the third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Id. at 
484. 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court employed the equal protection' 
clause of the fourteenth amendment to extend to single women the same right of access 
to contraceptives. Justice Brennan stated that "[i)f the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the indilJid,ud, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govem-
mental intrusion into matters 80 fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child." rd. at 453 (emphasis in original). 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), established the right of privacy as a fundamental 
right. Such a right is a protected personal liberty under the fourteenth amendment aDd 
includes decisions concerning family relationshipe, procreation, contraception, child rear-
ing and education. Id. at 152-53. The Roe court struck down a statute which outlawed 
abortions except those necessary to aave the mother's life. The Court stated the right of 
privacy included a woman's decision on whether to terminate her pregnancy.ld. at 153. 
Because this was a fundamental right, any state regulations must be justified by a com-
pelling state interest. rd. at 153-55. The state interests identified by the Court were pro-
tection of a woman's health and protection of the potential life of the fetus. rd. at 154. 
These interests, balanced against the woman's right of privacy, were found to be lea 
than compelling. rd. at 163-64. 
44. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). This case involved a Mi880uri statute which called for a w0-
man's informed consent, certain recordkeeping requirementl, and parental consent for 
minor women. 
45. rd. at 74. 
46. Id. The Court did not discU88 how this broader authority of the state could be 
Women's Law Forum 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/3
1982] PARENTAL NOTIFICATION 589 
the right of minor women to have abortions can be regulated 
there must be a significant state interest." Safeguarding the 
family unit and reinforcing parental authority were not, accord-
ing to the Court, interests served by providing a parent with an 
absolute veto. In addition, parental authority would not be en-
hanced by requiring parental consent!· 
In a companion case to Danforth, Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 
1),49 the Court considered a Massachusetts statute requiring ei-
ther parental consent or a court order before a physician could 
perform an abortion on a minor woman. The Court indicated 
that it might accept as constitutional some parental involve-
ment.IIO However, the case was remanded to the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court for further interpretation of the statute.II1 In 
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II),n the lower court's decision that 
the statute was unconstitutional was upheld in a plurality opin-
ion by Justice Powell. The Court noted: "[T]he tradition of pa-
rental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individ-
ual liberty. . . . Legal restrictions on minors, especially those 
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's 
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual 
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding."" The 
Court, however, distinguished the decision of a minor woman to 
seek an abortion from other decisions made during minority." 
Although parental deference might be permitted when other 
exercised constitutionally. 
47. Id. at 75. The Court did not state explicitly what a significant state interest 
involves, or whether the test for state interference was as strict as the test used when a 
compelling state interest is involved. 
48. Id. This statement reflects the court's awareneBB of the conflicts which may oc-
cur when a minor woman and her parents so disagree that the woman does not wish to 
inform her parents of the decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
49. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
50. See id. at 147. 
51. Id. at 146·52. The Court found the statute could have various constructions, 
even though it was argued by the state that the parental consent requirement did not 
create the kind of absolute veto held to be unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The M888achusetts Supreme Judicial Court was instructed 
to rule on the meaning of the statute, and the District Court was to decide the constitu-
tionality of the statute once the Judicial Court had ruled. 
52. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). After the M888achusetts Supreme Judicial Court inter-
preted the statute, the District Court again declared it unconstitutional. 
53. Id. at 638·39. 
54. Id. at 642. The decision to seek an abortion differs for example from the decision 
to marry before reaching majority. A minor can postpone her decision to marry, but she 
cannot postpone her decision to have an abortion. 
11
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choices face a minor woman, the "unique nature and conse-
quences of the abortion decision" made it inappropriate to give 
parents an absolute veto over the minor's abortion decision.1I1I 
The Court held that where a state requires parental consent 
for a minor woman to obtain an abortion, an alternative proce-
dure by which an abortion can be authorized must also be pro-
vided. lle The challenged statute was found to fall short of this 
constitutional standard because it did not allow every minor wo-
man access to an alternative proceeding. In addition, the statute 
permitted the withholding of judicial authorization from a minor 
who was found to be mature and fully competent to make an 
abortion decision. II' 
Thus, the Court in Danforth and Bellotti 11 established that 
a minor woman has a fundamental right of privacy, but also in-
dicated that a state has greater latitude in regulating this right 
than it has with adults." These two cases did not specify 
whether state interference with the right of minor women is sub-
ject to the same scrutiny by the Court as is true in cases involv-
ing adults. It has been asserted that "a significant state interest" 
is a less stringent standard than the compelling state interest 
required in Roe. a. It is apparent from Bellotti I and Bellotti 11 
that the Court will permit some parental involvement provided 
it does not constitute an absolute veto. How far a state can go in 
regulating a minor woman's right to privacy is not clear. 
55. Id. at 643 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74). 
56. 443 U.S. at 643. The purpose of such a proceeding would be for the minor wo-
man to show that she was mature and sufficiently well-informed to make a decision re-
garding an abortion independent of parental wishet and that, even if she was found to be 
immature, the abortion would be in her best interests. 
The mature minor concept is applicable in many medical situationa and "supports 
the competence of a minor to consent to [her) own health care when sufficiently mature 
to understand the benefits and risks of the propoaed treatment." BUR&\u 0' COMMUNITY 
HEALTH SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH SBRV., HBALTH SOY. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T 0' HEW, ADo-
LESCENT HBALTH CARE: A GUiDB 'OR BCHS,SupPORTBD PROGRAMS AND pROJBCTS 61-62 
(1979). [hereinafter cited as ADOLESCBNT HEALTH CARlI). 
57. 443 U.S. at 646·51. 
58. In Danforth, the Court recognized the state's authority to regulate some activi· 
ties of minors. 428 U.S. at 74. In Bellotti II, the state's authority was reaffirmed. 443 
U.S. at 642. 
59. Note, Parental Notice Statutes: Permissible Regulation of a Minor's Abortion 
Decision, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1980) (arguing that parental notification statutes do 
not burden a minor woman's right of privacy and that significant state interests are pro-
tected by such statutes). 
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III. H.L. v. MATHESON 
The issue of the constitutionality of parental notice statutes 
remains unresolved. A number of statutes requiring a physician 
to notify a minor woman's parents before performing an abor-
tion have either been struck down or enjoined by lower federal 
courts.60 Although these statutes were found unconstitutional, 
similar statutes remain in some states,6J while other legislatures 
60. Recently, three federal courts have found such statutes unconstitutional. Leigh 
v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 
(E.D. La. 1980); Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 
1979). A Louisiana statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 provided in part: 
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon an un-
married pregnant woman under the age of eighteen without 
first having given at least twenty-four hours actual notice to 
one of the parents or the legal guardian of the minor pregnant 
woman as to the' intention to perform such abortion. 
(Amended 1980) (West Supp .. 1982). The district court found the statute imposed an 
"undue burden upon the right to obtain an abortion of unmarried women between the 
ages of fifteen and seventeen." Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980). 
The Louisiana statute had a separate provision for women under 15: They could either 
obtain a court order for an abortion without notifying a parent, or obtain parental con-
sent. "Apparently, the State determined that a minor woman between the ages of fifteen 
and seventeen is mature enough to make the decision whether to obtain an abortion 
without the necessity of either parental consent or a court order." rd. at 204. The court 
found the Louisiana legislature had not considered a minor woman's constitutional right 
of privacy and that the statute might have "a chilling effect on the minor's right to 
independently make certain kinds of important decisions which are the basis of a wo-
man's constitutional righ~ to obtain an abortion." rd. 
In Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979), 
the district court preliminarily enjoined a Maine Statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
1597 (1980) which provides in part: "A person shall not perform an abortion on an un-
emancipated minor without first giving notice to one of her parents or guardians of his 
intention to perform that abortion or notifying the Department of Human Services of his 
inability to give notice." As in the decision reached by the Louisiana district court, the 
Maine court relied on Bellotti 11, in finding that the statute had a substantial probability 
of being found unconstitutional. The court was convinced by affidavits "showing that in 
some instances the involvement of parents in a minor's abortion decision will be harmful 
to both the minor and the family relationshiip." 477 F. Supp. at 547. 
A North Dakota statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03(1) (1981) (amended 1981) 
(Interim Supp. 1981) outlawing abortions for unemancipated minors without 24 hour 
actual notice was found unconstitutional in Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 
1980). This court, also relying on Bellotti II, held the statute's requirement of a parental 
notification in every case constituted an undue burden on the exercise of a minor wo-
man's right to obtain an abortion. 497 F. Supp. at 1349-50. 
61. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135(d) (1980) provides in part: 
[NJo abortion shall be performed upon an unmarried minor 
female without prior notification of parent or guardian, unless 
the minor is living apart from her parent or guardian and a 
reasonable effort to notify them has been unsuccessful. A re-
ceipt that a registered or certified letter was mailed attached 
13
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have refused to pass parental notification statutes.1I Addition-
ally, a bill now before Congress would require parental notifica-
tion before hospitals and clinics would be eligible for federal 
funds. 88 Resolution of the situation was expected when the Su-
preme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a Utah parental noti-
fication statute. This statute, upheld by the Utah Supreme 
Court, was challenged as an unconstitutional burden on a minor 
woman's right to an abortion." 
However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
H.L. v. Matheson81 only resolved the narrow issue of parental 
notification as it affects unemancipated minor women who make 
no claim as to maturity to give informed consent. The statute 
had been challenged as overbroad because it could apply to all 
unmarried minor women." Chief Justice Burger, writing the 
plurality opinion, stated that because the appellant lacked 
standing, it was not necessary to decide the question of the stat-
to a copy of the notice letter sent such parent . . . at his or 
her last known address shall be conclusive evidence of notice 
or attempted notice required by this subsection. 
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-5-616 (Spec. Supp. 1977) ("No abortion may be per-
formed upon any woman in the absence of. . . the written notice to a parent, if living, or 
the custodian or legal guardian of such woman, if she is under eighteen (18) years of ap 
and unmarried."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76·7·304 (1978) ("To enable the physician to ner· 
cise his beat medical judgment, he shall ... notify, if poIIIIible, the parents or guardian 
of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if ahe is a minor."). 
62. See infra notes 82 and 83. 
63. S. 1808, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (The Family Protection Act). The stated 
purpose of the Act is to "strengthen the American family and promote the virtues of 
family life through education, tax assistance, and related measures." The Act provides in 
part: 
No program, project, or entity shall receive Federal funds, ei· 
ther directly or indirectly, under any provisions of law unless 
such program, project, or entity, prior to providing any contra· 
ceptive device or abortion service (including abortion counsel· 
ing) to an unmarried minor, notifies the parents or guardians 
of such minor that such contraceptives are being provided. 
The Reagan administration has also drafted proposals requiring family Plannini 
clinics that receive federal funda to notify parents within ten days of a minor woman 
receiving prescription birth control devices. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1982, at 7, col. 1. 
64. H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah S. Ct. 1979). The Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that encouraging a minor to seek the advice of her parents promoted a signifi· 
cant state interest in supporting the important role of parents in child·rearing. Id. at 
912. 
65. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
66. ld. at 405. The appellant had contended that the Utah statute could be COD· 
strued as applying to mature and emancipated minor women. 
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ute's constitutionality as applied to mature or emancipated mi-
nor women.S? The only issue before the Court, according to Jus-
tice Burger, was the constitutionality of the statute requiring 
parental notification, "when the girl is living with and depen-
dent upon her parents, ' , , when she is not emancipated by 
marriage or otherwise, and , , , when she has made no claim or 
showing as to her maturity or as to her relations with her par-
ents,"68 With the issue narrowed to only unemancipated and im-
mature minors, the Chief Justice concluded the statute served 
the significant state interests of protecting family integrity and 
protecting minors:·' 
That the requirement of notice to parents may in-
hibit some minors from seeking abortions is not a 
valid basis to void the statute as applied to appel-
lant and the class properly before us. The Consti-
tution does not compel a State to fine-tune its 
statutes 80 as to encourage or facilitate 
abortions.70 
Justices Powell and Stewart joined the plurality opinion "on 
the understanding that it leaves open the question whether [the 
statute] unconstitutionally burdens the right of a mature minor 
or a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental 
notification."?l Justice Powell concluded that a state may not 
validly require notice to parents in all cases, 
without providing an independent decision-maker 
to whom a pregnant minor can have recourse if 
she believes that she is mature enough to make 
the abortion decision independently or that noti-
fication otherwise would not be in her best inter-
est. . . . The circumstances relevant to the abor-
67. "[T)he trial court found that appellant 'is unmarried, fifteen years of age, re-
sides at home and is a dependent of her parents.' That affords an insufficient basis for a 
finding that she is either mature or emancipated." 1d. at 406. 
68. 1d. at 407. 
69. 1d. at 411. The Court stated the statute "plainly serves the important considera-
tion of family integrity and protecting adolescents which we identified in Bellotti 11." 1d. 
(footnotes omitted). The Court also found the statute served a significant state interest 
by providing an opportunity for parents to supply a physician with essential medical 
information about the minor woman. 
70. 1d. at 413. The Court cited Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 291, 325 (1980): "[S)tate 
action 'encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances' is 'rationally re-
lated to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life.' " 450 U.S. at 
413. 
71. [d. at 414. 
15
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tion decision by a minor can and do vary so 
substantially that absolute rules-requiring pa-
rental notification in all cases or in none-would 
create an inBexibility that often would allow no 
consideration of the rights and interests [of the 
state, parents or minorJ.71 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but declined to 
join the opinion. He believed the Court had a duty to answer the 
broader question of the statute's constitutionality as applied to 
all minor women.'8 On that question, Justice Stevens asserted 
that a parental notice requirement would be justified in all 
cases. He based his opinion on a state's interest in protecting a 
"young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect 
abortion decision. "74 
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun, and found the plurality opinion too narrow. Justice 
Marshall disagreed that appellant lacked sufficient standing to 
challenge the Utah statute.7& He concluded that appellant did 
have standing and examined the statute to see if parental notifi-
cation placed any burdens on the minor woman's abortion deci-
sion. He noted, "[t]he ideal of a supportive family so pervades 
our culture that it may seem incongruous to examine 'burdens' 
imposed by a statute requiring parental notice of a minor daugh-
ter's decision to terminate her pregnancy."" However, he ac-
knowledged that many minor women would encounter interfer-
ence from their parents after their notification.77 The hardship 
created for these women'8 would be the result of a "state-im-
posed obstacle to the exercise of . . . free choice."71 The Utah 
72. Id. at 420. 
73. Id. at 421. 
74. Id. at 422-25. 
75. Id. at 426. 
76. Id. at 436-37. Justice Marshall stated that realistically many families do not live 
up to this ideal of the supportive family and that parental notification effectively would 
cancel a minor woman's right to avoid disclosure of her personal choice. 
77. Id. at 437. "Many minors, like appellant, oppose parental notice and seek in-
stead to preserve the fundamental personal right to privacy. It is for these minors that 
the parental notification requirement creates a problem." ld. 
78. ld. at 438-39. "Many minor women will encounter interference from their par-
ents after the state-imposed notification. In addition to parental disappointment and 
disapproval, the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial 
support, or actual obstruction of the abortion decision." Id. at 439. 
79. Id. at 441. Justice Marshall noted that the state-created obstacle did not operate 
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statute "unquestionably" burdened a minor woman's right of 
privacy, and none of the reasons offered by the state justified 
infringement upon this right.80 He stated the "Court must join 
the state courts and legislatures which have acknowledged the 
undoubted social reality: Some minors, in some circumstances, 
have the capacity and the need to determine their health care 
needs without involving their parents. "81 
The Court's ruling in Matheson is very narrow and has not 
resolved the issue of the constitutionality of parental notification 
statutes as applied to minor women who are mature enough to 
make the abortion decision independent of their parents. Three 
Justices upheld the constitutionality of parental notification re-
quirements for unemancipated and immature minor women, and 
one Justice found such requirements were not unconstitutional 
for any minor women. In addition, two members of the plurality 
expressed the opinion that a state must provide access to an in-
dependent decision-maker so that mature minor women have an 
alternative to notifying their parents. 
The lack of a definitive ruling from the Court will create 
confusion not only for state legislatures and lower courts, but 
also for those minor women who are subject to a variety of dif-
fering regulations.811 
in a neutral fashion. Because notice was not required for other pregnancy related medi-
cal care, only minor women who sought abortions encountered the burden imposed by 
the notification statute. 
SO. Id. at 446. Justice Marshall concluded that even if the state's purpose in encour-
aging consultation between the minor woman and her parents was legitimate, the statute 
failed to advance the asserted goal. "Parental consultation hardly seems a legitimate 
state purpose where the minor's pregnancy resulted from incest, where a hostile or abu-
sive parental response is assured, or where the minor's fear of such a response deters her 
from the abortion she desires." Id. 
81. Id. at 453. 
82. Since the Court ruling in Matheson, four states have enacted parental notifica-
tion statutes attempting to conform to Matheson. See 1981 Minn. Seas. Law Serv. cb. 
228 (West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 144.343), providing in part: "[N)o abortion opera-
tion shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a woman for whom a 
guardian or conservator has been appointed . . . until at least 48 hours after written 
notice of the pending operation." This statute also has an alternative provision providing 
for the possibility of one section being held invalid or enjoined. The alternative provision 
would provide a minor woman with a judicial proceeding if she elects not to allow notifi-
cation of her parents. No. REv. STAT. § 28-347 (Supp. 1981) provides for 24-hour notice 
to parents prior to an abortion for a minor woman, but also provides that: 
The district court or any judge thereof in the county in which 
the minor resides or the abortion is to be performed or, in the 
17
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IV. STATE INTERESTS SERVED BY PARENTAL 
NOTIFICATION 
In Matheson, the Court affirmed that the state interest in 
requiring parental notification must be significant to permit in-
fringement on a minor woman's right to privacy. The Court 
found the state's interests did outweigh an unemancipated mi-
nor woman's right. The question of what state interests are 
served by requiring parental notification is central to any analy-
sis of this area. 
One identified state interest in regulating a minor woman's 
access to an abortion is protection of the woman's health. II An-
other is protection and promotion of family integrity and paren-
tal authority." Parental notification requirements do not appear 
absence from the county of such district judge the county 
court or a judge thereof, shall, upon it appearing satisfactorily 
to the court or judge by the affidavit or testimony of the peti-
tioning minor that the minor is mature enough to make the 
abortion decision independently or that notification would not 
be in the minor's best interests, waive the notice requirements 
of . . . this section. 
NBV. RBV. STAT. § 442-255 (1981) provides in part: "A person shall not knowingly per-
form an abortion upon an unmarried and unemancipated woman who is under the age of 
eighteen years unless he notifies a parent or guardian of the woman at least 24 hours 
before the abortion, if it is possible to notify the parent or guardian." R.I. GEN. LAws I 
23-4.7-3.1 (Supp. 1981) provides: "In the C888 of a pregnant minor, the phyaiciaD ahall 
exercise reasonable diligence to notify the parent or legal guardian of the minor prior to 
performing the abortion, if feasible and practicable." 
The Minnesota and Nebraska statutes appear to be a direct response to the Sugpll-
tion by Justice Powell in Matheson that a state may not validly require notice to parente 
in all C8888 without providing an independent decision-maker. See 450 U.S. at 420. 
83. The California Legislature rejected a bill which would have required parental 
notice. The purpose of this bill was stated in terlDl of protecting a minor woman's 
health: 
The Legislature also finds that abortion is associated with an 
increased risk of complication in subsequent pregnancies, that 
the medical, emotional, and psychological consequences of an 
abortion are serious and can be lasting, and that the emotional 
and psychological effects of the pregnancy and abortion expe-
rience are markedly more severe in girls under 18 than in 
adults. The Legislature further finds that, if the pregnant girl 
elects to carry her child to term, the medical decisions to be 
made entail few-perhaps none-of the potentially grave emo-
tional and psychological consequenc:el of the deciaion to abort. 
S. 154, 1981-82 Reg. Seas. (Cal. 1981). The bill originally included parental consent pro-
visions which were eliminated. S. 154 died in committee. 
84. The other stated purpose of the proposed California parental notification statute 
was protection of family integrity and unity: 
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to serve or protect these interests when balanced against the mi-
nor woman's interests. The state's interest in the minor woman's 
health is, in fact, not served by requiring parental notification 
because, as noted earlier, parental notification can have ex-
tremely detrimental effects on a minor woman's psychological 
health.slI 
The Court has recognized that states have a valid interest in 
protecting and promoting family integrity and parental author-
ity." However, the Court has recognized that parental authority 
cannot be absolute.S? Although it might appear that encouraging 
a minor woman to consult her parents would, in many cases, 
promote family harmony, this would not be true in all cases. 
Where a minor woman and her parents disagree regarding her 
sexual activity, a requirement that the parents be informed of 
the possibility of abortion will do very little to promote family 
unity and harmony.88 . 
[d. 
The Legislature. furthermore, finds that enhancing the poten-
. tial for parental consultation concerning the abortion decision 
with its potentially traumatic and permanent consequences, is 
reasonably calculated to protect minors and thus furthers a 
constitutionally permissible end. The Legislature finds that 
this enhancement also plainly serves the important considera-
tions for family integrity and advances the constitutionally 
protected relationship between parents and child, including 
the parents' claim to authority in their own household, to di-
rect the rearing of their children, and the parents' important 
guiding role in the upbringing of their children, which U\cludes 
counseling them on important decisions. 
85. See supra note 35. 
86. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.s. 158 
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924). 
87. A parental veto was seen by the Court in Danforth as an impermissible exercile 
of parental authority: 
It is difficult, however. to conclude that providing a parent 
with absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the 
physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patiant's 
pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is 
it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority 
or control where the minor and the non-consenting parent are 
80 fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the 
pregnancy already has fractured the family structure. 
428 U.S. at 75. 
88. "[A]ny state interest in encouraging consultation between the daughter who is 
seeking an abortion and her parents is not necesaarily achieved by the notice requIre-
ment because merely giving notice to the parents does not asaure that there will be any 
meaningful dialogue." Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 204 (E.D. La. 1980). 
19
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Parental notification is based, in part, on the assumption 
that once a minor woman's parents have been notified, the wo-
man and her parents will rationally discuss her decision to ob-
tain an abortion. As a result of this dialogue, the parents and the 
minor woman will make a decision that is ostensibly in the best 
interests of the daughter." But when a minor woman has de-
cided to seek an abortion without her parents' knowledge, this 
discussion may not take place, or if it does, may result in a deci-
sion that is not in the minor woman's best interests. It may re-
sult instead in family argument and strife. eo The state, therefore, 
rather than promoting and protecting family integrity, would be 
contributing to the already existing strife. The state interest in 
safeguarding the family, in this situation, is clearly outweighed 
by the minor woman's right of privacy. 
An underlying state interest in requiring parental notifica-
tion is prevention of teenage sexual activity and teenage 
pregnancies.·1 This interest reBects a concern for preserving cer-
tain moral values regarding pre-marital sexual activity." The 
belief that the rise in teenage sexual activity is due to accessible 
abortion appears to be one motivating factor behind abortion 
regulation." However, teenage sexual activity and access to 
abortions do not correlate. N Exact reasons behind the increase 
89. "Ostensibly, the notice requirement furthers the Statea' interest in insuring that 
parents are given the opportunity to participate in an important and potentially trau-
matic decision in the life of their minor daughter, thus promoting family dialogue and 
harmony." ld. 
90. It is unrealistic •.. to asaume that [a supporting and understand-
ing) intra-family relationship exists in every caae, and where such a 
relationship does not exist, the required notification is leas likely to 
result in an objective determination as to whether the minor is ma-
ture and well enough informed to make an intelligent abortion 
decision. 
Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1350 (D.N.D. 1980). 
91. This interest is one which is promoted strongly by interest groups who feel that 
aCC88B to abortion and contraceptives, as well as sex education, is responsible for the rise 
in minors' sexual activity. "Members of the Moral Majority believe that stringent legisla-
tion limiting minors' rights to privacy will be an effective method of controlling and 
deterring sexuality: if birth control and abortion are not readily available, the teenagers 
will think twice about reckl888 sexual behavior." Meyers, Ilupra note I, at 20. 
92. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Justice Brennan was 
unpersuaded that there Wall a significant lltate interest in promoting a policy of discour-
aging sexual activity among minors by prohibiting aCC888 to contraceptives. 
93. See supra note 91. 
94. In 1973, Roe struck down lltate laws outlawing abortion except to save a wo-
man's life. Danforth extended the right to decide whether or not to bear a child to mi-
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in teenage sexual activity are unknown. It has been postulated 
that the age of sexual maturation has dropped significantly, re-
sulting in teenagers becoming sexually active at earlier ages. 'II 
Requiring parental notification will not significantly affect this 
increase in sexual activity: "The imposition of parental consent 
or notification would not impel all young adolescents to tell their 
parents about their decision . . . to have an abortion, or to stop 
having seL"" 
Another interest served by required parental notice is pre-
vention of abortions. This interest appears to be intertwined 
with that of preserving moral values. Opposition to abortion is 
never explicitly stated as a reason for parental notification legis-
lation; most statutes have protection of the family, in some 
form, as a stated purpose.'" However, opposition to abortion is 
the primary interest served by such statutes. 
For some groups, abortion represents the taking of innocent 
life; others view motherhood as a woman's primary role, and 
pregnancy as an honor for which women are chosen.'s Women 
who reject this "honor," either by remaining childless or by ter-
minating a pregnancy, are seen as a threat to the status quo." 
nors in 1976. Between 1961 and 1974, out·of-wedlock births for 14- to 17-year-olds in-
creased 75%. 11 MILLION 'ruNAGIRS, '"pro note 26, at 13. The significance of this 
increase is that it occurred before abortion became legally available to minor women. 
95. "Without question, early coitus is closely associated with early biologic develop-
ment. Acceleration of sexual development and behavior has occurred at the same time as 
a relaxation of aocietal standards." AooLB8CBNT HIw.TH CARB supra note 56, at 33. 
Not only are minors maturing usually at an earlier age, but they are also the target 
of advertising campaigns suggesting that to be attractive and popular, they should be 
sexy. A recent development in this campaign has been the use of post-pubescent young 
women in place of adult women for advertisement of jeans, cosmetics, perfumes and high 
fashion. 
96. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, '"pro note 30, at 291. 
97. Many statutes use protection of the family or protection of the parent-child re-
lationship 811 a basis for requiring parental notice. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-51 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981) (enacted to support rights and responsibilities of par-
ents); UTAH CODB ANN. I 76-7-304 (1978) (found in Criminal Code under Offenses 
Against the Family). See 0160 '"pro note 84. 
98. "An important corollary of the right to life argument was its implications of the 
role and responsibility of women as mothers"; women are expected to make the required 
sacrifices for childbearing and 8 woman's primary responsibility is to carry a pregnancy 
to term. A. STBINHOFf & M. DIAMOND, ABORTION POLITICS: THB HAWAII EXPERIENCE 106-
10 (1977). "Childbirth has nowhere been regarded merely as one possible event in a wo-
man's life." Rich, The Theft of Childbirth, in SEIZING OUR BODIES: THE POLmcs Or 
WOMEN'S HEALTH 146 (C. Dreifus ed. 1977). 
99. "The value of a woman's Ufe would appear to be contingent on her being preg-
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These women have refused to accept their culturally imposed 
role to bear children and continue the species.loo Much anti-
abortion sentfment is also combined with religious fundamental-
ism as abortion is believed to be a major sign of moral permis-
siveness.10I Groups opposed to abortion, therefore, focus on ei-
ther overturning the Supreme Court's decision in Roe or 
lobbying for legislation limiting access to abortion. lOll Recent 
federal legislation limiting access to abortion reflects this bias. loa 
Congressmen who openly oppose abortion l 0.4 have introduced 
nant or newly delivered. Women who refuse to become mothers are not merely emotion-
ally suspect, they are dangerous." Rich, supra note 97, at 148. 
100. [d. 
10l. "A new and frightening factor has been added to the politics of abortion. This 
is the powerful movement of fundamentalists into the antiabortion cause." Simmons, 
Fundamentalism and Abortion Politics, 4 PLANNED PARENTHOOD REV. 12 (1981). Funda-
mentalism is a form of religious zeal whose followers see themselves as acting to save the 
world from moral decline. Some leaders of the fundamentalist movement have aligned 
themselves with ultra·conservative politicians and groups to form the Christian Right. 
The result is the formation of groups such as the Moral Majority founded and led by the 
Reverend Jerry Falwell, a Baptist from Virginia, whose primary goal is to ban abortion. 
The movement also includes the Christian Voice, a California· based group whose board 
includes Senators Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah), James McClure (R.-Idaho), Roger Jepsen 
(R.-Iowa) and Gordon Humphrey (R.-N.H.). [d. 
102. Legislation has been introduced in Congress aimed at overturning Roe. See 
supra note 17. The Human Life Statute would do what the Court in Roe expressly re-
fused to do: Declare that the word "person" in the fourteenth amendment includes the 
unborn and allow states to prosecute abortion as murder. This legislation has the sup-
port of the National Right to Life Committee, the largest antiabortion organization. The 
Human Life Federalism amendment, which would authorize Congress and the states to 
prohibit or regulate abortion, was introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah and has 
the backing of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Donovan, Half a Loaf: A 
New Antiabortion Strategy, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 262 (1981). 
103. See supra note 13. 
104. When the Human Life Federalism amendment was introduced in the House of 
Representatives by Representative Ashbrook (R.-Ohio), he stated: 
For far too long, the people of this country have been frus-
trated in their efforts to petition their government for a re-
dreBS of grievances in this matter [abortion). The CQurts have 
consistently struck down moat legislative efforts to limit or 
even regulate abortion. Spousal and parental conllent require-
ments are virtually nonexistent, and in most instances, minor 
daughters can obtain abortions even without parental 
knowledge. 
What we have in this country today is nothing less than 
runaway, wide-open abortion-on-demand. There are no real 
restrictions on the so-called right to abortion that was created 
in the Supreme Court's 1973 decision. 
H.R.J. Res. 372, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONGo REc. 9407·9, 9408 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 
1981). 
Representative Henry J. Hyde (R.-lll.), who introduced the Human Life Statute, is 
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bills reflecting this viewpoint. Antiabortion and fundamentalist 
groups have also applied substantial pressure on state and fed-
eral officials in legislative hearings and elections.·· 
As the rate of teenage pregnancy climbs, antiabortion and 
fundamentalist groups point to access to abortion as a major 
cause of this increase.·· Requiring parental notice is viewed as a 
method of preventing reckless teenage sexual activity.·.., As 
vocal in his opposition to abortion and repreaents antiabortion interests In Congress. 
Q Repreaentative Hyde, why are you in favor of outlawiDi 
abortion? 
A Because abortion is the kIIlinI or an innocently inconve-
nient human ure . . .• 
Q Shouldn't a woman have a right to decide tbia question for 
herself? 
A No. Neither a woman nor a man should have the right to 
kill another human bein,. The fetus or embryo in the woman 
is a separate human hein, with Ita own blood-circulation aya-
tem and brain waves. 
Should Abortions Be Outlawed? Interview witla RepreMntatiue Henry J. Hyde, U.s. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 1981, at 31. 
Other Congressmen openly oppoeed to abortion include, Senators Jeremiah Dent.oD 
(R.-Ala.), Don Nickles (R.-Okla.) and Rudy Boecbwita (R.-Minn.), co-spoDIOn of the 
Human Life Federalism amendment, and Senator .I ... Helma (R.-N.C.), co-sponaor 01 
the Human Life statute. 
105. Tactics employed by antiabortion and fundamentalist grouP' include: Use of 
public forums featuring expert speakers qainat abortion, opinion polla, use or the media 
by interviews and publication of advertiaementa, letter writinc campaigns, IDUI demon-
strations showing pictures of fetal development, and lobbyina efforts with legislaton. A. 
Steinhoff & M. Diamond, supra note 98, at 36-59. 
By joiniq forces with fundamentalist grouP' and conservative politicians, antiabor-
tion groups have been able to raise larp suma or money to inc:reue their influence upon 
elections. Political action committees such u Senator J .... Helma' National Conpes-
sional Club raised $7.9 million in the 1979-80 election year and spent ".6 million to 
support the presidential bid of Ronald Reagan. The National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Committee raised $7.6 million and spent ts.2 million, much or It for negative adver-
tisin, aimed at defeatinc liberal senaton. S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 21, 1982, at 2, col. 3. 
The 1980 elections reflected the increased efforts or antiabortionista to OUit pro-
choice candidates from office. 
The 97th Congress Is considerably more conservative--and 
more opposed to legal abortion-than Ita predeceaaor, with the 
Republicans having gained control of the Senate. Moreover, 
prochoice Democrats such as John Culver (Iowa), Warren 
Magnuson (Wash.)j George McGovern (S.Dak.) and Birch 
Bayh have been replaced in the Senate by such New Right 
and antiabortion activist Republicans .. John East (N.C.), 
Charles Grassley (Iowa), Don Nicldea and Jeremiah Denton. 
Donovan, supra note 101, at 265. 
106. See supra note 91. 
107. Id. 
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noted above, parental notice will not significantly deter sexual 
activity. lOS It will, however, have a significant impact on a minor 
woman's access to an abortion. Parental intervention resulting 
from notification may prevent some minor women from ob-
taining abortions. loe Additionally, fear of parental notification 
may prevent many other minor women from seeking abor-
tions. l1° This fear is a major reason minor women delay seeking 
an abortion. 111 It is the contention of this author that preventing 
or limiting access to abortion will be the singular effect of re-
quiring parental notice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At present, a state can require parental consent if it pro-
vides a judicial process as an alternative to consent.11I A state 
can also require parental notification for a minor woman who is 
unemancipated or is not mature enough to make an abortion de-
cision independently.ua The Court in Matheson failed to decide 
the constitutionality of parental notification for mature minor 
women. 
This reluctance to find such procedures burdensome on a 
minor woman's right of privacy is based on the idea that they do 
not affect a minor woman's right to an abortion. The Court is 
not willing to address the fact that a parental notification re-
quirement will effectively prevent access to abortion. Many mi-
108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text. 
110. When asked what they would do if it was required that their parents be noti-
fied of their decision to seek an abortion, nine percent of the women surveyed say 
that they would have a self-induced or an illegal abortion, an-
other nine percent say they would have the baby, two percent 
say that they would leave home and three percent say that 
they don't know what they would do. Some of their resPOI18e8 
might be considered irrational (for example, having the child 
would not prevent their parents from finding out about the 
pregnancy). The responses do indicate, however, that a sizea-
ble proportion of teenagers believe that the notification of 
their parents would put them in a desperate situation and that 
they would be forced to resort to desperate measure. to deal 
with it. 
Torres, Forrest & Eisman, supra note 30, at 288. 
111. Jd. 
112. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 113 (1979). 
113. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
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nor women will be unable to obtain an abortion after their par-
ents have been notified. As noted by Justice Marshall in 
Matheson, such notification requirements are based on the ideal 
of a supportive family. However, many families do not live up to 
this ideal.114 
The Matheson decision also leaves lower courts and state 
legislatures with no significant guidelines1111 as the members of 
the plurality opinion expressed different opinions on the consti-
tutionality of parental notification requirements for mature mi-
nors. The issue needs to be resolved; until it is, minor women 
will be subject to many differing and confusing regulations when 
they seek to obtain an abortion. 
Parental notification statutes place an undue burden on a 
minor woman's right of privacy. They do not serve any signifi-
cant state interest inasmuch as the parent-child relationship and 
family harmony are not enhanced by such restrictive laws. When 
a minor woman is in conflict with her parents regarding her sex-
ual activity, notifying the parents of the decision to have an 
abortion will most often increase family strife. The minor wo-
man's mental or physical health is, therefore, not protected. 
Such a result affects the minor woman's right of privacy. This 
fundamental right is precisely that which notification statutes 
seek to abrogate. 
Opposition to abortion per se should be recognized as the 
underlying reason for parental notice requirements. The courts 
must look beyond the stated interests and recognize that argu-
ments premised on protection of the family and family values 
are used by antiabortion forces to restrict access to abortion. 
Only by a thorough examination of the interests served by pa-
rental notification statutes can courts decide the constitutional-
ity of such statutes. The courts must engage in this examination 
to preserve the right of privacy established in Danforth and 
Bellotti. 
Susan A. Bush 
114. [d. at 436. 
115. See supra note 82. 
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